As good as married:a model of long-term cohabitation, learning and marriage by Gu, Xinhua & Rao Sahib, Padma
  
 University of Groningen
As good as married
Gu, Xinhua; Rao Sahib, Padma
IMPORTANT NOTE: You are advised to consult the publisher's version (publisher's PDF) if you wish to cite from
it. Please check the document version below.
Document Version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Publication date:
2002
Link to publication in University of Groningen/UMCG research database
Citation for published version (APA):
Gu, X., & Rao Sahib, P. (2002). As good as married: a model of long-term cohabitation, learning and
marriage. s.n.
Copyright
Other than for strictly personal use, it is not permitted to download or to forward/distribute the text or part of it without the consent of the
author(s) and/or copyright holder(s), unless the work is under an open content license (like Creative Commons).
Take-down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Downloaded from the University of Groningen/UMCG research database (Pure): http://www.rug.nl/research/portal. For technical reasons the
number of authors shown on this cover page is limited to 10 maximum.
Download date: 12-11-2019
As good as married: a model of long-term
cohabitation, learning and marriage1.
Xinhua Gu2 Padma Rao Sahib3
SOM Theme D: Regional Science
1We thank Marco Haan for useful comments.
2Department of Economics, University of Toronto, 150 St. George Street, Toronto,
Ontario, M5S 3G7, Canada, fax +1 416 978 6713, email: xinhuagu@chass.utoronto.ca.
3Corresponding author, Department of International Economics and Business, Faculty
of Economics, University of Groningen, PO Box 800, 9700 AV Groningen, The Netherlands,
fax: +31 50 363 7337, email: p.rao.sahib@eco.rug.nl.
Abstract
This paper develops a two-sided search-matching model with imperfectly observed
types and learning. Since agents do not observe one another’s type accurately, they
ﬁrst engage in a probationary partnership to learn one another’s true type. Using the
metaphor of premarital cohabitation and marriage, we demonstrate that long-term
cohabiting individuals eventually learn each other’s true type. We also demonstrate
that singles of either sex are partitioned into classes and are matched in the same
class in equilibrium. We show that sequential learning reduces signalling errors so
that the Bayes estimator of the true type converges almost surely to true type. As
noisy information is ﬁltered over time, the mismatch risk disappears and the aggregate
matching pattern based on true types is restored.
Keywords: two-sided search-matching, marriage, premarital cohabitation, imperfect
information, Bayesian learning.
JEL classiﬁcation: D83, D84, J12.
1 Introduction
There is a growing literature on modelling long-term partnership formation (see Bur-
dett and Coles 1999 for a survey). The models typically used are two-sided search-
matching models (SM) which incorporate features of marriage and labour markets
such as incomplete information about characteristics, bilateral meetings that occur
at uncertain intervals (one does not meet prospective spouses on a daily basis) and
heterogeneity across individuals or ﬁrms. Among studies in this literature are Collins
and McNamara (1990), Morgan (1995, 1996), Smith (1997), Shimer and Smith (2000),
Bloch and Ryder (2000), Burdett and Wright (1998) and Chade (1999, 2001). Many
of such models yield positive assortative mating, a positive association of the traits
of partners, as an equilibrium outcome. The decision rule in such models is simple.
Each party employs a cut-oﬀ rule accepting the other as partner only if a certain
minimum requirement is attained and what you see is what you get. Once such a
partnership is formed, the pair leave the market forever.
While models in the search-matching literature include many features of long-
term partnership formation, they do not incorporate the probationary period that
precedes many long-term relationships. Workers may be on a temporary contract
before getting a permanent one, couples may date or cohabit before marrying and
you may want to try a sports club a few times before signing up for an entire year.
Such probationary relationships arise because both parties have limited informa-
tion about each other. Long-term relationships, as anyone who has experienced a
divorce will agree, can be costly to dissolve. Temporary relationships, however, are
easier to dissolve and can serve the purpose of information gathering. While the
success of a temporary relationship cannot guarantee the success of the long-term
relationship that may follow it, it is generally believed that temporary relationships
1
allow both parties to make a more informed choice. Among studies that incorporate
imperfectly observed information of this particular type in SM models are Chade
(1999) and Rao Sahib and Gu (2002a, 2002b). In Chade, agents observe and match
on imperfectly observed type but never learn true type. However, Chade also in-
corporates the information contained in whether or not a partner is accepted which
leads to strategies that are non-monotonic in the characteristics of individuals. In
Rao Sahib and Gu (2002a), a simple model of premarital cohabitation and learning
is developed in which couples cohabit prior to marriage for one period at the end
of which their true qualities are revealed to one another. At this juncture, couples
either marry or separate. Rao Sahib and Gu (2002b) explores the implications of
relaxing the assumption of risk neutrality in a two-sided search-matching framework.
In the current paper, we allow premarital cohabitation lasts until the true qualities of
at least one partner is revealed to the other. Therefore, premarital cohabitation can
last for a random number of periods. Cohabiting couples receive information shocks
about each other and therefore learn over time about each other’s true qualities.
In this paper, we extend a two-sided search-matching (henceforth SM) model to
incorporate this frequently observed feature of long-term partnerships. We develop
our model using marriage and premarital cohabitation as a metaphor, although the
model with some modiﬁcations may be interpreted as a model of marriage with the op-
tion to get a divorce. Using the framework originally developed in Burdett and Coles
(1997) hereafter simply Burdett and Coles, we incorporate imperfect information of
a particular type and learning in the SM context. We use Bayesian learning tech-
niques similar to those used in Jovanovic (1979) and Prescott and Townsend (1980)
to address sequential learning. Our focus is on the decision making of the individual
rather than the aggregate implications of marriage markets with matching.
In contrast to many studies in which an individual’s type is instantly observed
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on contact, we assume that match quality is gradually revealed and individuals learn
each others’ worth over time. Therefore, in our model, couples cohabit with one
another for one or more time periods before forming a long-run marital partnership.
Because of learning, a match once formed may dissolve as a consequence of rational
choice. Cohabitation, therefore, does not always lead to marriage.
We retain however, other assumptions often made in SM models (1) stationary
market environment: the distribution of types among singles in the market is constant
over time, and individuals believe that the market may be characterized this way; (2)
stationary Nash strategy: the search strategy is a list of the opposite sex singles to
whom a particular single will propose on contact. Singles compete for a good opposite
sex partner by maximizing their utility, given the other singles’ behaviour and the
constraints they have to face deﬁned by their own types; (3) rational expectation
equilibrium: the realized distribution of types among singles in the market coincides
with their subjective steady state distribution, which is taken as given when analyzing
the individual’s optimization behaviour. Therefore, our focus is on Nash equilibrium
rather than market equilibrium.
We show that the equilibrium class partition result as obtained in previous studies
holds even under uncertainty of information. Although the introduction of learning
in the equilibrium matching model substantially complicates the SM framework, it
generate new insights into issues related to the intertemporal properties of a long-run
partnership. In terms of our analogy of cohabitation and marriage, this implies that
long-term cohabiting couples eventually learn one another’s true type.
The next section describes the marriage market with the incorporation of uncer-
tainty. Section 3 discusses Bayesian learning in the SM context. Section 4 concludes
and the Appendix provides some proofs of results in the paper.
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2 The marriage market
2.1 Uncertainty and information
We assume that a large and equal number of male and female singles participate in a
marriage market. Using the terminology in Burdett and Coles, the attractiveness of
each individual as a marriage partner is assumed to be a real number called ‘pizazz’
or type x (we use type and pizazz interchangeably in the rest of the paper). Pizazz
is a comprehensive index that takes into account all the factors that make up an
individual’s attractiveness in the marriage market. Pizazz is important because it is
the if a man and woman marry, the man receives the pizazz of the woman as utility
and vice versa and the instantaneous utility of being single is zero. For the population
of men in the market, there is a known distribution GM (x) of men’s pizazz types from
which a woman draws oﬀers. That is, before a woman meets a man with type x in
the market, GM (x) is her prior probability that the man’s pizazz is not greater than
x. Similarly, the women’s pizazz distribution, is denoted GW (x). For simplicity, we
assume that GM (x) = GW (x) = G (x) = P (X ≤ x) with support [x, x]. In this
sense, the SM process is random.
To ease exposition, we discuss a woman’s search problem in detail. Throughout
the woman is treated as decision maker and the man’s search problem can be handled
by symmetry. For now, learning is assumed to take place only once. Suppose that the
woman meets a man of true type x (that is, she draws an oﬀer from the distribution
of X). She is unable to observe a man’s true type because it is distorted by random
noise, ε, where E (ε) = 0 and V ar (ε) is small. She observes y, which is a realization
of the signal Y = X +ε, where ε⊥X. The conditional mean pizazz is denoted M
= E (X | Y ) and its realization is denoted m. The woman is assumed to infer the
man’s true type x from his noisy signal y according to the noise reduction rule,
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m = m (y) = E (X | Y = y). Notice that m = x̂ is also the Bayes estimator of
x obtained by minimizing a risk function, which is the expectation of a quadratic
loss function with respect to1 Q (x | y) = P (X ≤ x | Y = y). This is the woman’s








We make two additional assumptions to address the issue of class partitions with
learning. The ﬁrst (A1) is that m′ (y) > 0, suggesting that the higher the value of a
man’s observed pizazz y, the greater the woman’s perception of him, reﬂected by a
higher m. From A1, it can be seen that m = m (y) is invertible so that y = y (m)
exists. It is straightforward to derive the distribution of M : F (m) = P (M ≤ m)
= P (Y ≤ y (m)) = FY (y (m)), its support denoted [m,m].
The second assumption (A2) is related to Q (x | y), whose mean is simply m by
deﬁnition. Using y = y (m), one can transform Q (x | y) into Q (x | m). We assume
in A2 that ∂Q (x | m) /∂m < 0. Under A2, the distribution of pizazz of a man with
a higher level of m′ ﬁrst-order stochastically dominates that of another man with a
lower m′′ since Q (x | m′) < Q (x | m′′). The degree of stochastic dominance increases
1The joint distribution density of (X,Y ), f (x, y), is involved in the calculation of Q (x | y) and
F (m) in the following way:
Q (x | y) =
∫ x
x
f (x, y) dy∫ x
x
f (x, y) dx





f (x, y) dxdy.
When X ∼ N(µ, σ20) and ε ∼ N(0, 1), the correlation coeﬃcient ρ between X and Y is σ0/
√
σ20 + 1,
and hence the joint distribution density is












In the case of normal distributions, x and m should be set equal to ∞ in the text of the paper.
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with rising levels of m. This assumption is important and underlies the equilibrium
matching.
For example, consider x ∼ N (µ, σ20), ε ∼ N (0, σ2ε). Let m0 = µ. Suppose2 that
after drawing x, only y1 = x + ε1 is observed where ε1⊥x. Then, we have x̂1 = m1
= m (y1) as a Bayes estimator for x1 ≡ (x | y1) ∼ N (m1, σ21), where
m1 = w0m0 + (1− w0) y1, σ21 = w0σ20, (1)






ε). In the above, them0-related term is the revision of estimating
x based on y1 through the weighted average involving the variances of two underlying
distributions regarding x and ε. Clearly, m′ (y1) = 1− w0 > 0, and A1 is met. Since





< 0 where φ (·) is the standard normal density, we
know that A2 is also met. Since
Ex̂1 = E (m1) = E [E (x | y1)] = E (x) = µ, (2)













< σ20 < σ
2
y1
(= σ20 + σ
2
ε). Note that m1 is not only more informative than y1 since it is an
inference about x from y1, but also more precise in estimating a particular x since
σ2m1|x (= (1− w0)





In terms of the mechanics of the model, a parameterizing variable is needed to
take into account the eﬀect of the woman’s own type on her SM opportunities in
the market. In general, the higher her own type, the more easily can she can attract
potential partners of higher types. Since the woman has an incentive to over-state
her own pizazz, her potential partners act according to their own perception m˜ of her
2For simplicity, we henceforth follow the convention of using lower-case letters to refer both to
random variables and their realization.
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true pizazz x˜ based on her signal y˜. Here, m˜ = E
(
X˜ | Y˜ = y˜
)
serves as a ﬁlter used
by men to reduce part of noise in the signalled pizazz of the woman. Therefore, m˜ is
a feasible candidate for parameterization. On the contrary, it is illogical to use x˜ as
a parameterizing instrument since x˜ is not observed by men in the earlier stages of
SM . That is, before her true type x˜ is revealed, only her ﬁltered signal m˜ matters in
aﬀecting her opportunities in contacting single men.
A complication arises however, if m˜ is used for parameterization. Even if the
woman knows her own type x˜, she is not sure what signal y˜ men receive when they
meet her. This is because her noise ε˜ is purely random and the market is assumed
to be memoryless. Since m˜ is stochastic from a woman’s own standpoint, the utility
R (m˜) of her being single would be random if it is parameterized with m˜. To eliminate
the randomness arising from parameterizing R with m˜, as required in a standard
search model, we utilize the woman’s expectation of her m˜ conditional on her private
information about x˜ as the parameterizing variable. Denote m˜e = E [m (y˜) | x˜] =
Eε˜ [m (x˜+ ε˜)] = me (x˜), which is, under A1, an increasing function of x˜ after the noise
have been averaged out. In the normal distribution case, me (x˜) = w0µ+ (1− w0) x˜.
This weighted average of x˜ (her privately-known type) and µ (her ex ante estimate of
the men’s estimate of her type) should give this woman a reasonable estimate of the
value of her m˜ as perceived by men in the market. In what follows, we parameterize
the men’s pizazz distribution faced by a single female. We write F (m | m˜e) as the
distribution of conditional mean pizazz among single men who will propose to cohabit
with an m˜e-type woman when they meet. We next describe the process and decisions
related to meeting and matching.
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2.2 Meeting and Matching
Since singles in the market have diﬃculty contacting each other, a Poisson process is
used to characterize a market participant’s opportunities of encountering the opposite
sex. Let α be the total arrival rate of oﬀers of cohabitation that are made by all
opposite sex singles and received by any single of either sex. Since singles of diﬀerent
types face diﬀerent opportunities, only part of these oﬀers are received by a m˜e-type
woman. We denote the oﬀer arrival rate faced by an m˜e-type woman by α (m˜e) and
α (m˜e) ≤ α. It is intuitive to assume that the arrival rate faced by an m˜e-type woman
is positively related to her type. That is, the more attractive the woman, the more
oﬀers of cohabitation she receives.
Since cohabitation unions are initiated on the basis of imperfect information, they
may dissolve when one or both parties ﬁnd the other’s type too low. Therefore, we
introduce another Poisson process to model the probability that a woman learns
the true type of her cohabiting partner. Therefore, λ is the rate of arrival of new
signals that leads to the revelation of the partner’s true type. When this occurs, a
cohabitation relationship may be transformed into marriage or dissolve.
Learning about match quality is assumed to take place in three stages in the
context of the Poisson process approximation. This is similar to the exposition in
Sargent (1987) of the three-stage model matching model from Jovanovic (1979). The
separation into three stages is for the sake of analytic convenience, although the
division into stages is not very clear in this continuous-time setting in which oﬀers
arrive at random intervals.
Recall that if a man and a woman decide to marry, the woman’s utility from the
match is assumed to equal the man’s pizazz and vice versa. Similar to other studies
in this literature, we rule out narcissism. The advantage to a woman of possessing
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high pizazz (me (x˜)) is that it enables her to attract (captured by α (m˜e)) men of
higher types (captured by F (m | m˜e)).
In this setting, a marriage search model is nested in a cohabitation search model.
The two models are interrelated by the parameterizing variable m˜e.
In stage 1, the pre-draw stage, a woman is in the singles market looking for a
partner. At this moment she only knows F (m). Only nature determines whether she
will meet a man who will propose to cohabit with her and this occurs at random.
Hence, R (m˜e), the lifetime utility of the m˜e-type woman being single and receiving




[um˜e (m)h+ α (m˜e)hEmVm˜e (m) + (1− α (m˜e)h)R (m˜e)] + o (h) .
(3)
In the above, Vm˜e (m) is the value function of this m˜e-type woman having an oﬀer of
cohabitation from a m-type man in the next stage and behaving optimally later on.
The discount rate is r, α (m˜e)h is the probability of receiving an oﬀer of cohabitation
within a time interval of short length h, and (1− α (m˜e)h) the probability of receiving
no oﬀers during this interval. Given that we have already ruled out narcissism, we
simplify our calculations further by assuming um˜e (m) = u (m) = m. Since there is
no partner at this time, m = 0. Noting that o (h) /h → 0 as h → 0, and rewriting
eqn (3), we obtain
R (m˜e) =
α (m˜e)
r + α (m˜e)
EmVm˜e (m) . (4)
Stage 2 marks the stage when the woman has received an oﬀer of cohabitation
from an x-type man with a signal y. She must then decide whether to accept him as
a cohabiting partner. This woman’s value function in this stage is derived from the
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cohabitation search model as follows:
Vm˜e (m) = max
{
ϕm˜e (m) , R (m˜e)
}
.
In the above, ϕm˜e (m) is the utility of the m˜e-type woman accepting an oﬀer from an
m-type man in this stage and behaving optimally later on. If she decides to cohabit
with him, she receives as instantaneous utility the expected value of his true pizazz





u (m)h+ λhEx|yJm˜e (x) + (1− λh)ϕm˜e (m)
]
+ o (h) . (5)
Here, λh is the probability in the next stage h, that the woman receives a new signal
that reveals her cohabiting partner’s true type (the woman then decides whether or
not to marry him. (1− λh) is the probability of not receiving any new signals and
continuing in the current cohabiting union. In our model, cohabiting couples are not
allowed to transit directly to another cohabiting union without a intervening period
of singlehood. Jm˜e (x) is the value function of ﬁnding out her partner’s true pizazz x
and having to choose between marrying him and leaving him. The expectation of this
value function is taken with respect to x conditional on its observation y (= y (m))





In stage 3, the true pizazz of her cohabiting partner is revealed to the woman and
she must decide whether to marry her cohabiting partner after having found out his
true type x. Her value function in this stage can be characterized by the marriage
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search model as follows:
Jm˜e (x) = max
{
ψm˜e (x) , R (m˜e)
}
,
where ψm˜e (x) = x/r = ψ (x) is the utility of accepting an oﬀer for marriage in this
stage and staying married forever.
The above inter-dependent search models maybe solved treating them as a dy-
namic programming problem by working backwards. The optimal strategy for the
m˜e-type woman in stage 3 is a reservation pizazz policy: marry the man if his true
pizazz x  xr, where xr = rR (m˜e) = ψ−1 (R (m˜e)) is the minimum type of a spouse
acceptable to this woman. Similarly, the woman’s optimal strategy in stage 2 is also
a reservation strategy: cohabit with a man if his conditional mean pizazz m  mr,
where mr = ϕ
−1
m˜e
(R (m˜e)) is the minimum conditional mean pizazz acceptable to this
woman in a cohabiting partner.
To solve for the utility of the woman being single in stage 1, we ﬁrst calculate the






[1− F (m | m˜e)] dmϕm˜e (m) +R (m˜e) . (7)
Substituting this into eqn (4) yields R (m˜e) for this m˜e-type woman:
R (m˜e) =
α (m˜e)















This is also the utility of being single for the whole population in the market if m˜e
= me (x˜) changes with diﬀerent true types x˜ across single individuals. Blackwell’s suf-
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ﬁcient conditions ensure that there exists a unique solution to this functional equation
in R (m˜e) which is continuous in
[
ϕ−1m˜e (R (m˜e)) ,m
]
. By symmetry, we have another
functional equation in R (me) for a me-type man as the decision-maker, which is
identical to eqn (8) except that me and m˜e are interchanged. The use of symmetry is
justiﬁed by the assumption that the underlying distributions for both sexes are the
same: GM (x) = GW (x). From these two functional equations class partitioning can
be obtained.
It should be noted that the optimal reservation policy as an ex ante decision
rule derived from a search model must be determined based on the underlying oﬀer
distribution and prior to the realization of any oﬀers. Any speciﬁc oﬀer realization
only matters in ex post decision making but has no impact on the formulation of the
decision rule. Therefore, to be precise, we should treat xr as being determined in stage
2; we do so only to highlight the information updating related to the realization of y at
stage 2. However, y is still random in the ﬁrst stage 1, and hence Q (x | y) or Q (x | m)
is unknown at stage 1 (though the distribution of m is prior knowledge). In fact, the
model implies that the woman as a decision-maker, does not derive her reservation
pizazz policy for marriage from a single signal issued by a particular man she meets.
Also, this is a continuous-time setting with what are in fact two interrelated search
models. In theory, the woman has to determine, ex ante, xr as well as mr by solving
the above setting based on her knowledge of the prior distributions, G (x) and F (m).
Using truncated distributions and discounted arrival rates the class partition at
the aggregate level may be derived. It can be shown that the utility of being single, for
either a man or woman, is a non-decreasing step function, and this result ultimately
leads to the class partition (see Rao Sahib and Gu 2002a for a detailed exposition).
Therefore, market participants can be split up into n distinct classes in equilibrium so
that matches, cohabitation or marital, take place only between the two sexes in the
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same class. The class partition for marriage is consistent with that for cohabitation on
a one-to-one basis in the symmetric equilibrium, consistent with our assumption that
cohabitation is a probationary period that precedes marriage. Individuals set higher
cut-oﬀ levels for marriage than for cohabitation and this follows from the assumption
that observed pizazz is a noisy version of true pizazz (Rao Sahib and Gu 2002a).
Since ε is a pure random noise having zero mean and trivial variance, and therefore
causes no systematic distortions, the two classes are unlikely to deviate much from
each other, and may coincide in the extreme case when ε converges almost surely
(a.s.) to zero.
The macro pattern of matching induced by class partition is not Pareto optimal
due to imperfect information, in the sense that a low-type single can increase his or
her welfare through mismatch. This is a situation faced by a single whose partner is
qualiﬁed for cohabitation but not for marriage, which is revealed in the later stage
of cohabitation. The mismatch can be achieved by mis-signalling at the partner’s
expense if strategic interaction is allowed. The cohabiting individual of higher type
will suﬀer a utility loss as opposed to what she or he would otherwise receive when
matched with a partner of compatible type under perfect information.
3 Bayesian sequential learning
In the case of one-period learning, it is possible, though not very likely (because σ2ε
is assumed to be small), for a person with very high (or low) pizazz x to generate a
very low (or high) signal y. In this case, even though m ﬁlters the noise in observed
pizazz and the variance of m is less than that of y or even x, the imprecision still
remains in cohabitation and causes the risk of mismatch. We now discuss the case of
multiple-period learning, in which information updating takes place in each period.
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Of course, one must keep in mind that updating of information does not pertain only
to the signal received in the ﬁrst period but also to subsequent signals which may
contain errors. As before, it is assumed that there is no opportunistic behaviour or
deliberate mis-signalling.
To make the mechanism of noise reduction clear we change now to the discrete-
time setting but still maintain the assumption of a stationary market environment in
which G (x, t) = G (x) where t is time index. We ﬁrst discuss certain issues related
to the individual’s optimization problem. Regarding the probability structure of this
setting, we keep the analytics simple by assuming that the underlying distributions
are normal as in the normal example presented earlier.
In the pre-draw stage, the information set is I0 = {φ}. In period 1, a single woman
contacting a single man is in fact sampling from x0 ≡ (x | I0) = x ∼ N (m0, σ20). Upon
drawing from the observed pizazz distribution, only y1 = x0 + ε1 is observed with
ε1 ⊥ {I0, x0}. The woman then has a new information set I1 = {y1} ∪ I0 in this
period, and x1 ≡ (x0 | y1) = (x | I1) ∼ N (m1, σ21), where its moments were stated in
the normal example (as shown in (1)). From this time on, Bayesian learning is used
to consecutively update information as the woman cohabits with the same man to
learn more and more about him. The information set in period t is It = {y1, · · · , yt},
the set of signals received until this period. In period t+1, the woman samples from
xt ∼ N (mt, σ2t ). She observes signal yt+1 = xt+ εt+1 with εt+1 ⊥ {It, xt}. This yields







mt+1 = wtmt + (1− wt) yt+1, σ2t+1 = σ2twt < σ2t , (9)






ε) (see Appendix (5.2)).
This recursive relation is the same as the Kalman ﬁltering mechanism for noise
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reduction in signal extraction. The updated inference mt+1 is the weighted average
of the last inference mt and the new signal yt+1. Since Cov [(mt, yt+1) | mt] = 0 (see
Appendix (5.3)), we then refer to mt and yt+1 as conditionally uncorrelated. So, this
new inference is a linear combination of the two conditionally uncorrelated elements.
The variance σ2t of this kind of inference decreases with the updating of information.
The coeﬃcient wt is the fraction of σ
2
ε that causes a noise eﬀect. The larger is this
fraction, the smaller is the weight placed on yt+1 in revising mt to form mt+1, and
the more reliable it is to rely upon mt to predict mt+1 than to use yt+1. It is more
likely in this case that yt+1 reﬂects the noise eﬀect rather than the true type, for the
informational content of yt+1 = (x | It) + εt+1 decreases with rising σ2ε.
Noting that mt+1 = E (xt+1) = E (x | It+1), we see that mt+1 is just the Bayes
estimator of (x | It+1). In other words, mt+1 = x̂t+1 is an observable, workable
decision variable; whereas xt+1 is a latent, underlying process of sequential learning
about true type x from all previous signals in It+1. Letting ht = 1/σ
2
t be the precision
of xt, setting σ
2
ε = 1 for simplicity, and iterating (9), yields
ht = h0 + t→∞, mt = µh0/t+ x+ εt
h0/t+ 1
→ x, as t→∞. (10)




a.s.→ E (ε) = 0 by the Kolmogorov law of large numbers. Since
E (xt) = mt




→ 0 as t→∞, we know from asymptotic
theory, that xt
p→ x (convergence in probability) and hence xt d→ x (convergence in
distribution)3. That is, Qt ≡ Q (x | It) = Q (xt)→ G (x) as t→∞. This distribution
known at t is referred to as the posterior distribution because its mean mt becomes
3Since x is stochastic ex ante, we know that xt
p→ x ⇒ xt d→ x prior to the realization of x. If x
is realized, then we have only xt
p→ x, where x is a constant ex post. Mathematically, for mt a.s.→ x,
a true type x can only be revealed after an inﬁnite amount of time: t =∞.
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known only after yt has been realized even if its variance is known in advance at the
pre-draw stage.
Although mt is known ex post and unknown ex ante, its distribution is known ex
ante with mt









Ft ≡ F (mt), like G (x), should be viewed as a prior distribution even if its argument
mt involves information updating. This is because both the mean and variance of
F (mt) are known at the pre-draw stage, and a normal distribution is entirely de-
termined by its mean and variance. Note that σ2mt , monotonic with t, reaches its
minimum at t = 1 and then increases all way to σ20 at a diminishing rate as t →∞.
We term this the monotone property of σ2mt for later use. This implies that from the
ex ante perspective at the pre-draw stage, F (mt) is riskier than F (mt−1) and G (x) is
riskier than F (mt) for any t (the farther into the future, the more the uncertainty).
The decision-makers’ prior knowledge of the riskiness of these distributions deter-
mines the amount of risk premia accruing to them, as shown in the next section. The
distribution of mt, although ultimately approaching x, is more concentrated around
µ for smaller values of t. This suggests that the estimation of a speciﬁc true type
x using ﬁltered signals mt in earlier periods relies heavily upon µ, the mean of the
population X from which this particular x is drawn.
Next, we explore the asymptotic property of a new random variable (mt+1 | mt).
We use this random variable in the intermediate stage of the multi-period learning
search model which will be discussed next. Utilizing the conditional uncorrelation
property mentioned above, and the serial independence of noises, one can derive, from
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(9) (see Appendix (5.3)), that as t→∞,
E (mt+1 | mt) = mt → x, V ar (mt+1 | mt) = σ2t (1− wt)→ 0. (12)
It then follows that (mt+1 | mt) ∼ N [mt, σ2t (1− wt)] which is known at t, and
Plim (mt+1 | mt) = x. Thus, (mt+1 | mt) d→ x. That is, the (second sort of) posterior
distribution Kt ≡ K (mt+1 | mt) → G (x) as t → ∞. It is now obvious that the
magnitude of σ2ε becomes less important once multiple-period learning is incorporated
and a larger σ2ε only slows down the speed of convergence. Therefore, we arrive at
Theorem 1 Sequential sampling from xt =(x | It) and its Bayes estimator mt = x̂t,
along with (mt+1 | mt), converge in probability or almost surely to the true type x.
Therefore, all the sampling distributions (Qt, Ft, Kt) must converge to the population
distribution (G) of true types. The greater the learning, the lower the uncertainty;
the imprecision σ2t (prior) or σ
′2
t (posterior) associated with a cohabiting union (given
its survival), approaches zero through learning over inﬁnitely many time periods.
In what follows, ζ is the probability of receiving a new signal from the current
cohabiting partner, λ is the probability of receiving a signal leading to revealing the
partner’s true type and β = 1/ (1 + r) is the discount factor. The posterior distribu-
tionK (mt+1 | mt) for t ≥ 1 is not truncated, and onlyK (m1 | m0, m˜e) = F (m1 | m˜e)
involves the parameterization by m˜e. Building upon the above probability structure,
a SM model with t1-period cohabitation can be speciﬁed as follows:
R (m˜e) =
βα (m˜e)
1− β [1− α (m˜e)]Em1|m˜eVm˜e (m1) , (13)
Vm˜e (mt) = max
{
mt + βζEmt+1|mtVm˜e (mt+1)
1− β (1− ζ) , R (m˜e)
}
; t = 1, · · · , (t1 − 1),
Vm˜e (mt1) = max
{
mt + βλEx|It1Jm˜e (x)




Jm˜e (x) = max {x+ βJm˜e (x) , R (m˜e)} .
The reservation pizazz mrt as a decision rule derived from the posterior distri-
bution K (mt+1 | mt) in period-t search model depends upon the realization of mt.
However, mt is unknown ex ante, and any decision rule must be established at t = 0,
which provides a role for the prior distribution F (mt) to play in determining the
decision rule ex ante. This, along with the last theorem, implies
Corollary 2 Given learning over an inﬁnite horizon, the updated inference {mt}
does indeed lead to the revelation of a particular partner’s true type x. This results in
an individual making the correct decision about whether or not to accept a partner’s
oﬀer for marriage. The posterior distributions (Qt, Kt) upon which a realization-
dependent decision rule for each period of cohabitation is based, approach the prior
distribution (G) of true pizazz among singles in the market. The realization-dependent
decision rules are governed by the prior distribution (Ft) of future realizations mt.
The solution to the above set of interrelated search models with multiple-period
learning, and its implications for matching and partitioning are presented next.
The setting in (13) can be used by a woman as decision-maker to carry out her
search for a partnership. Suppose this t1-period cohabitation setting produces a
sequence of reservation demands for her cohabiting partner’s and spouse’s types in
all periods: (mr1, · · · , mrt1 , xr). It is implied that she and her partner would have to
return to the singles pool at any time t (≤ t1) if their cohabiting union has survived
(t − 1) periods but at least one party fails to meet the other party’s reservation
demand mrt at period t. This model artiﬁcially stipulates that a partner’s true
type must be revealed through gradual learning after t1-period cohabitation. If both
sides survive the t1-time selection determined by the other side’s updated optimal
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reservation strategies, then they will be in a position to decide on whether to marry,
which is speciﬁed by the last functional equation in Jm˜e (x).
By symmetry, the same setting (13) can also be treated as the decision-making
model for the man. It is the interaction of this type between both parties that leads
to matching and partitioning, such as (mjr1, · · · , mjrt1 , xjr) for 1 ≤ j ≤ n, where j is
the class index, and n the number of classes. As j changes, the partitioning bounds
form a n× (t1 + 1) matrix. As claimed by Burdett and Coles (1999), the uncertainty
of a long-term partnership (or the mismatch risk in our model) can be reduced but
not eliminated by updating information unless an inﬁnite-period cohabiting scheme
sets in. In this case, the last two equations in (13) should be dropped and t1 is allowed
to go to inﬁnity. The class partition for the multiple learning setting can be proven
to exist in a way similar to how the class partition is proven to exist in the absence
of learning (see Rao Sahib and Gu 2002a) with certain modiﬁcations. It is obvious
that the class partition in period t ≤ t1, (m1rt, · · · , mnrt) with one more time-period
of learning, is Pareto superior to its period-(t− 1)’s counterpart, (m1r,t−1, · · · , mnr,t−1).
Also, the Pareto eﬃciency will be almost surely (a.s.) attained at a stable pattern of
macro mating (x1r, · · · , xnr ). In this sense, the equilibrium matching pattern in BC is
the limiting case of our model. We next examine a 3-period cohabitation model as a
heuristic case.
3.1 Example: A three-period cohabitation model
In this example, we continue to consider a 3-stage framework. That is, the example
consists of a pre-draw stage, a cohabiting stage (lasting three periods), and marital
stage (this last stage can continue indeﬁnitely). The calculation involved in solving
the model (13) for t1 = 3 is still quite tedious. Since this is a multi-period model, we
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should solve the last-period problem (marital search) ﬁrst and then work backwards
up to the pre-draw stage. To solve the search problem in each period, we must
ﬁrst derive the decision-maker’s optimal reservation strategy and ﬁnally the utility
of being single. For convenience, we assume that ζ = λ = 1. That is, receiving a
new signal and information updating occurs with certainty in each period. We use
integration by parts repeatedly in the calculation (see Appendix (5.4)). The solution
to the interrelated search problems, beginning with the marital stage and working
backwards through cohabiting to pre-draw stages, is characterized by
xr = (1− β)R (m˜e) ,




[1−Q (x | mr3)] dx,
xr −mr2 = β
m∫
mr3









xr −mr1 = β
m∫
mr2


























−∂K (m2 | m1)
∂m1
× (15)
1 + β m∫
mr3
















Obviously, xr > mrt ∀t, and R (m˜e) > 0 as desired, where




























a term similar to β (· · · , · · ·), eqn (15) can then be viewed as indicating the inﬁnite
horizon case where t1 →∞. In this case, eqns in (14) need to be modiﬁed accordingly.
By substituting (15) into (14), a set of four equations in four unknowns (xr,
mr3, mr2, mr1) can be obtained as the optimality conditions which characterize the







Diﬀerentiating this set and applying the implicit function theorem suggests that the
reservation pizazz in each period and the utility of being single depend on the vari-
ances of the prior and posterior distributions. In class partitioning, the upper limits
of the integrals with respect to mt (for t > 1) and x remain unchanged, whereas the
upper limit of the integral with respect to m1 keeps changing. If a woman as the
decision-maker believes that she is perceived as having m˜e = m, then substituting
this into (15) yields mr1 so that (m
1
r1,m] is identiﬁed as the top class of cohabitation
in period 1. Then m1r1 will be used as the upper limit of the integral with respect




r1] for period 1. This
procedure is continued for the third class, fourth class and so on. The procedure for
the class partition in the case of the other periods can be carried out in the same
manner.
An intuitive explanation for why xr > mrt ∀t is as follows. At the pre-draw stage,
the woman has two types of prior information that matter in establishing, ex ante,
her decision rules. The ﬁrst is F (mt) which is related to cohabitation search, and
the second is G (x) which is related to marital search. With the same mean µ for
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these distributions and the monotone property σ2mt ≤ σ2, G (x) is a mean-preserving
spread of F (mt). Her rational response to the riskier distribution G (x) as opposed to
F (mt), is to become more exacting at the pre-draw stage in establishing the decision
rule for a marital over a cohabiting union to be formed later on. Therefore, her
reservation demand for the marital partner’s pizazz is higher than her reservation
demand for the cohabiting partner’ pizazz. It follows then that (xr −mrt)≡ RPt is
simply a kind of risk premium to compensate her for the higher risk she must bear
in search of marriage relative to cohabitation.
From the above, we can establish (see Appendix (5.5)) that for any class j,
(i) the reservation demand rises with the tenure of a partnership such that mjr1
≤ mjr2 ≤ · · · ≤ xjr. That is, the risk premium always exists across the periods of
cohabitation until the marital stage;
(ii) the risk premium is shrinking with learning over time such that RP jt ≤ RP jt−1
∀t, where RP jt = mjrt − mjr,t−1; and (iii) RP jt1 → 0 as t1 → ∞, in which case the
marital class partition is restored.
The underlying reason for point (i) is that µmt = µ ∀t and σ2mt displays a monotone
property across cohabiting periods, as shown in (11). Therefore, the prior distribution
for period t, F (mt) is riskier than the prior distribution for period t − 1, F (mt−1).
As a result, the decision-maker must demand a risk premium for compensation em-
bedded in the ex ante decision rules, that is why mjr,t−1 ≤ mjrt. Similarly, mjrt ≤ xjr.
Point (ii) is in agreement with the fact in (12) that σ2(mt+1|mt) decreases with informa-
tion updating over time. Even if µ(mt+1|mt) = mt is still stochastic from the pre-draw
standpoint, this favorable property concerning the precision of the posterior distribu-
tion K (mt+1 | mt) shows that signalling errors continue to reduce under sequential
learning. Therefore, the risk premium decreases period by period. Point (iii) is con-
sistent with the result of (mt+1 | mt) p→ x. This implies that an ideal class partition by
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the market participants’ true types can be achieved only in the limiting case, when all
noises have been eliminated through inﬁnite learning. These points are summarized
in
Theorem 3 The greater the learning, the more selective are individuals in search
of a partnership and the lower will be the mismatch risk in class partition. The
risk premium, though non-zero during the entire process, decreases with sequential
learning and approaches zero once the correct pattern of class partition based on true
types is restored.
It is important to note that random noise as the source of mismatch accompanies
each contact between the sexes, and that people have to learn from their mistakes
under uncertainty of information. The possibility of mismatch is therefore allowed
for in cohabitation. This may particularly be the case in the early stages of SM
when substantial signalling error may arise because there may be a large discrepancy
between true type x˜ and parameterizing type me (x˜) for a single individual. New
noises continue to arrive over the course of a partnership. This is reduced through
Bayesian sequential learning. The persistence of mismatch risk during all premarital
periods of a relationship is the reason why cohabiting individuals raise their reserva-
tion demands for their partners’ type. Similarly, marriage is associated with a higher
reservation demand than cohabiting partnerships.
4 Conclusion
This paper incorporates imperfect information and learning into a two-sided search
matching model. We use the analogy of premarital cohabitation and marriage, and
assume that couples initially cohabit to ﬁnd out more about each other before getting
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married. During cohabitation, couples continue to receive signals about one another
although these signals are noisy. They are assumed to use Bayesian updating to infer
the true type of their partner. We show that couples whose cohabiting relationships
survive eventually learn one another’s true type. Equilibrium is characterized by a
class partition: couples cohabitation and marriages occur among individuals within
the same class. With learning, the class partition corresponding to cohabiting re-
lationships then approaches the class partition of marital unions which are formed
based on true type. That is, the mismatch risk continues to decrease as the couple
learn more and more about one another. The continued updating of information dur-
ing cohabitation restores the pattern of matching at the aggregate level that is based
on true types. Concurrently, the risk premia borne by individuals diminishes with se-
quential learning and ﬁnally disappears when true type is revealed. We leave market
equilibrium determination in the context of imperfect information and learning as a
topic for further research.
5 Appendix
5.1 Derivation of (7)
Expanding the expectation of the value function in stage 3, we obtain





















[1−Q (x | m)] dx+R (m˜e) . (16)
We have used xr = rR(m˜e) in the third equality and applied the technique of inte-
gration by parts and xr = ψ
−1 (R (m˜e)) to the last equality. We omit m˜e and other
arguments of a function here and below to keep notations simple.
Recalling that ϕm˜e (m) = R (m˜e), and applying the same procedure as above to
the expectation of the value function in stage 2: EV (m) = Emax {ϕ,R}, one can
derive (7) in the text of the paper.
5.2 Derivation of (9)
























1− ρ2) , ρ = Cov (x, y)
σxσy
. (17)
The calculation in the text is performed by sequentially employing this formula for t
= 1, 2, 3, .... Here we show how to do this in the general case. Consider a cohabiting
woman who has It = {y1, · · · , yt} in hand. She samples xt from (x | It) ∼ N (mt, σ2t )
but obtains yt+1 = xt + εt+1 with εt+1 ⊥ {It, xt}. Then
µyt+1 = E (xt | It) + E (εt+1 | It) = E [(x | It) | It] = E (x | It) = mt,
σ2yt+1 = σ
2 (xt | It) + σ2 (εt+1 | It) = σ2 (xt) + σ2 (εt+1) = σ2t + σ2ε.
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According to (17), she will face a new posterior distribution











)] ≡ N (mt+1, σ2t+1) .
(18)
Using εt+1 ⊥ {It, xt} again yields
cov [(xt, yt+1) | It] = σ2 (xt | It) + cov [(xt, εt+1) | It] = σ2t ,
Substituting from the above yields:
µxt = E (xt) = E (x | It) = mt, ρxtyt+1 =





























Therefore, it follows from (18) and (19) that
mt+1 = mt + (1− wt) (yt+1 −mt) , σ2t+1 = σ2twt.
This gives (9) in the text.
5.3 Derivation of (12)
Noticing that for x = z, E [(xy) | z] = zE (y | z) and E (x | z) = z, and using
cov [(x, y) | z] = E [(xy) | z]− E (x | z)E (y | z) ,
we know that cov [(mt, yt+1) | mt] = 0.
Using this and (9), recalling that E (εt+1 | yt) = 0, and noting that [(x | It) | yt]
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= (x | It), the moments of (mt+1 | mt) are calculated as follows:
E (mt+1 | mt) = wtE (mt | mt) + (1− wt)E (yt+1 | yt)
= wtmt + (1− wt)E [(x | It) | yt]
= wtmt + (1− wt)E (xt) = mt,
σ2 (mt+1 | mt) = w2tσ2 (mt | mt) + (1− wt)2 σ2 (yt+1 | yt)
+2wt (1− wt) cov [(mt, yt+1) | mt]
= (1− wt)2
{








= (1− wt)σ2t .
Then, (12) obtains.
5.4 Derivation of (14) and (15)
To obtain the solution to (13), work backwards. Solve the period-4 problem ﬁrst.
Evaluating its value function at xr, and calculating the period-3 expectation of the
period-4 value function, Ex|I3J (x) (or interchangeably, EQ(x|m3)J), in the same way
as in (16), we have





(x− xr) dQ (x | m3) +R.
Evaluating the period-3 value function at mr3 to have mr3 +βEx|mr3J (x) = R, and
calculating the period-2 expectation of the period-3 value function, Em3|m2V (m3), in
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the same manner as in (16), yields the following:












(x− xr) dQ (x | m3)
 dK (m3 | m2) +R.
Repeating the above procedure for period 2 to calculate
xr −mr2 = β
m∫
mr3




(x− xr) dQ (x | m3)




m2 − xr + β
m∫
mr3




(x− xr) dQ (x | m3)

dK (m3 | m2)} dK (m2 | m1) +R. (21)
Applying the same calculation to period 1 results in
xr −mr1 = β
m∫
mr2
m2 − xr + β
m∫
mr3




(x− xr) dQ (x | m3)
 (22)





m1 − xr + β
m∫
mr2
m2 − xr + β
m∫
mr3





dQ (x | m3)] dK (m3 | m2)} dK (m2 | m1)〉 dF (m1) +R.
Substituting the expression for Em1V (m1) into the ﬁrst equation in (13) to yield the







m1 − xr + β
m∫
mr2
m2 − xr + β
m∫
mr3






dQ (x | m3)] dK (m3 | m2)} dK (m2 | m1)〉 dF (m1) . (23)
First applying the technique of integration by parts to these formulae in the same
fashion as in the treatment of (16), and then substituting from (20), (21) and (22),
we obtain (14) and (15) in the text.
5.5 Reservation demand rises with tenure
To prove that reservation pizazz types mrt rise with tenure t, we need to simplify and
modify the notation used in (13) by omitting m˜e, letting ζ = λ = 1 , and assuming











, t = 1, 2, 3, . . .
Vt (m) replaces V (mt), and Kt (m
′ | m) = K (m′ | m,σ′2t ) represents K (mt+1 | mt).
The above notational changes do not alter the nature of the original model.
Several steps are taken to complete the proof. (i) First, Jensen’s inequality is
used to develop the property of second-order stochastic dominance of Kt+1 (m
′) over
Kt (m
′), where σ′2t+1 < σ
′2
t . In what follows, we sometimes drop m (and in some cases
m′), for simplicity. Considering Kt (m′′) as a mean-preserving spread of Kt+1 (m′),
in the sense that each possible outcome m′ is randomized further so as to have m′′
= m′ + z, where z ∼ Hz|m′ (z | 0, σ2z). Since E [Ψ (m)]  Ψ [E (m)] when Ψ (m) is
convex, we use the iterated expectations theorem, to obtain
EKtΨ(m
′′) = E(m′,z)Ψ(m′ + z) = Em′
{











(ii) We apply mathematical induction to compare the relative magnitude of the
value functions between diﬀerent periods of cohabitation. Since this model is forward-
looking, we should adopt the backward induction approach. By this we show that
Vt (m)  Vt+1 (m). (a) We ﬁrst check whether this is true for the two limiting cases
t1 = ∞ and t1 − 1. If the decision maker’s cohabiting with any particular partner
of x type survives all periods up to t1 where mt1 = x, then the continuous random
variable (mt1+1 | mt1) degenerates into this realized type x at t1 (recalling (12)) and
thus Vt1 (x) = x, in which case R (the utility of being single) is not involved owing to
the cohabitation. However, one can imagine that x is less clear at period t1−1 than it
is at t1, and hence (mt1 | mt1−1) is still contains uncertainty. Then, EKt1−1(x|m)Vt1 (x)
= m , and so
Vt1−1 (m) = max
{
m+ βEKt1−1(x|m)Vt1 (x) , R
}
 m (1 + β)  m = Vt1 (m) . (26)
(b) Suppose a similar result holds for previous periods t + 1 and t + 2. That is,
Vt+1 (m)  Vt+2 (m). (c) Then we prove that this is also the case for periods t and
t+ 1. From (b) and (25), it follows that if Vt (m) is convex, then
EKtVt+1 (m
′′)  EKtVt+2 (m′′)  EKt+1Vt+2 (m′) ,
which, under (24), implies that Vt (m)  Vt+1 (m) for any possible m.
(iii) Since m +βEKt(m′|m)Vt+1 (m
′) is larger than m +βEKt+1(m′|m)Vt+2 (m
′) for
every m, and mrt and mr,t+1 are the values of m at which the individual is indiﬀerent
between being single (and receiving R) and continuing in a relationship, it follows
that mrt > mr,t+1. Finally, letting t change across periods yields the monotonic
property of {mrt}.
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(iv) We prove by induction that Vt (m) is nondecreasing. Due to (26), we know
that Vt1 (x) and Vt1−1 (m) are nondecreasing. Suppose Vt+1 (m) is also nondecreasing.
Then, recalling the ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance of a normal distribution with
increasing mean, we have
EKt(m′|mA)Vt+1 (m
′)  EKt(m′|mB)Vt+1 (m′) , for mA  mB,
which, by (24), yields that Vt (mA)  Vt (mB) for mA  mB.
(v) Proving that Vt (m) is convex is also done by induction. Obviously, Vt1 (x)
and Vt1−1 (m) are convex. Assuming that Vt+1 (m) is convex, deﬁne V t+1 (m) =
EKt(S|m)Vt+1 (S). Then, it is to be shown that V t+1 (m) is convex, as well. For any λ
∈ (0, 1) and any (m1, m2) (assuming m1 < m2 without losing generality), consider








































= λEKt(S|m1)Vt+1 (S) + (1− λ)EKt(S|m2)Vt+1 (S) = λV t+1 (m1) + (1− λ)V t+1 (m2) .
The second equality involves the change of variables: S ′ = S − λm1 − (1− λ)m2;
the inequality is the application of Jensen’s inequality. The third equality uses once
again the change of variables: S ′′ = S ′+m1, S ′′′ = S ′+m2. Finally, for proving that
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Vt (m) is convex, it suﬃces to show
Vt [λm1 + (1− λ)m2] = [λm1 + (1− λ)m2] + V t+1 [λm1 + (1− λ)m2]
≤ λm1 + (1− λ)m2 + λV t+1 (m1) + (1− λ)V t+1 (m2)
= λ
[
m1 + V t+1 (m1)
]
+ (1− λ) [m2 + V t+1 (m2)]
= λVt (m1) + (1− λ)Vt (m2) .
The ﬁrst equality assumes λm1 + (1− λ)m2  mrt so that max operator and R can
be dropped; the inequality uses the convexity of V t+1 (m); the third equality assumes
m2, m1  mrt. The proof is similar and may be simpler for the other cases of (m1,
m2 < mrt) and (m1 ≤ mr,t+1, m2 > mrt) in which R must be considered.
The fundamental diﬀerence between the two value functions Vt (m) in model (24)
lies in the diﬀerence in the variances σ′2t of their underlying posterior distributions.
Informally, although any diﬀerence in reservation pizazz (mr,t+1 − mrt)= RPt is an




3 , · · · · · ·), it is directly aﬀected by σ′2t . Since σ′2t de-
creases with time, the risk premium must be also falling. Alternatively, the variances
σ2t of prior distributions F (mt) increase at a decreasing rate, mrt (as an increasing




3, · · · · · ·)) must be increasing at a decreasing rate.
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